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Interpreting Quantum Theories attempts and achieves no less than three dif-
ferent goals. First, it provides an accessible introduction to the conceptual
foundations of the algebraic approach to quantum theories—today’s most
promising rigorous framework for the formulation of quantum theories that
includes those applying to systems with an infinite number of degrees of free-
dom. Second, it presents the most important interpretive challenges posed
by these latter theories, collectively referred to by Ruetsche as “QM∞”.
Third, it relates the problem of interpreting QM∞ to more general topics in
the philosophy of science, in particular the much discussed issue of scientific
realism.
The overall structure of the book is as follows: Chapter 1 sets the stage
for what follows by providing some background considerations in terms of
more general philosophy of science on what it means to interpret a phys-
ical theory. Chapters 2-4 introduce the conceptual basics of the algebraic
formulation of quantum theories with particular emphasis on how it gener-
alises standard Hilbert space quantum mechanics (“QM”). After a review of
axiomatic approaches in Chapter 5, some apparently very natural, yet com-
peting, interpretive strategies for theories of QM∞ are outlined in Chapter
6, discussed in some detail here further below. Chapters 7 and 8 focus on
one particular challenge posed by the interpretation of QM∞, namely that in
these theories, unlike in ordinary QM, the algebras of linear operators used
to describe quantum systems typically do not include any finite-dimensional
projections. One of the startling implications of this is that the standard
preparation recipes for quantum states as familiar from ordinary QM become
problematic in the context of QM∞ in that no operators projecting the pre-
measurement state on a putative “collapsed” or (appealing to Lu¨ders’ Rule
as a generalised version of the projection postulate) “Lu¨ders conditional-
ized state”1 are at hand. On similar grounds, the issue of the bearers of
probabilities seems much more complicated in QM∞ than in ordinary QM.
1See p. 171. Where not specified otherwise, quotations are from “Interpreting Quantum
Theories”.
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The next chapters of the book, Chapters 9-11, turn to the question of
whether theories of QM∞, as formulated in the algebraic framework, can
be construed as being about entities that deserve being called “element-
ary particles”. Ruetsche introduces and discusses a number of fascinating
effects and phenomena that bear on this issue (namely, the Unruh effect,
coherent states, Haag’s theorem, and cosmological particle creation), to ar-
rive at the conclusion that all we can hope for is to interpret QM∞ in terms
of a phenomenological particle notion. Such a notion delivers the prospect
of grounding particle phenomenology as familiar from accelerators and de-
tectors without at the same time sustaining a particle ontology in terms of
particles as fundamental objects everything in the world consists of.
Chapters 12-14 present Ruetsche’s main argument, which she calls the
“Coalesced Structures Argument”, in favour of the central claim of the book
that no single interpretive strategy can account for the full explanatory
force of QM∞ in all contexts. Both this claim itself and the structure and
key moves of the argument that supports it are discussed in some detail
below. To conclude the present overview, Chapter 15 closes the book by
connecting the considerations presented in the previous chapters to more
general questions in the philosophy of science.
The interpretive issues Ruetsche addresses require a formulation in the
vocabulary of the algebraic approach to quantum theories. Some basic no-
tions of this approach are introduced in the next two paragraphs to make
the subsequent discussion of some key ideas of the book accessible to the
reader who is not familiar with this conceptual framework.
The algebraic formulation of quantum theories can be construed as a
generalisation of the standard Hilbert space formalism of ordinary QM. In
ordinary QM, the observables of a quantum system are represented by the
self-adjoint elements of an algebra B(H) of bounded linear operators on a
Hilbert space H, and the possible states of the system are expressed as
density matrices on H. In the algebraic approach one starts in a more
abstract way in terms of a C∗ algebra2 and defines the states ω as linear
functionals from A into the set C of complex numbers, such that ω(I) = 1
and ω(A∗A) ≥ 1 for all A ∈ A. To a first approximation (at least), one may
think of the self-adjoint elements of A ∈ A as observables of the system and
of ω(A) as the expectation value of A ascribed by the state ω.
A Hilbert space representation pi maps the C∗ algebra A into an algebra
B(H) of bounded linear operators on a Hilbert space H while preserving
all algebraic relations. In ordinary QM, the image pi(A) of A under pi (or,
more precisely, its so-called “strong closure” pi(A)′′3) is isomorphic to some
2An algebra is a vector space with a bilinear vector product defined on it. A C∗ algebra
is an algebra that is isomorphic to a sub-algebra of some algebra B(H) of bounded linear
operators on a Hilbert space H that is closed with respect to the adjoint operation ∗.
3A sequence An of operators on H is said to converge in the “strong topology” iff
|(An −A)|ψ〉| 7→ 0 as n 7→ ∞ for each |ψ〉 ∈ H. The “strong closure” of pi(A) includes all
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B(H). As a consequence, all representations pi of A are unitarily equival-
ent, which means that for any two representations (pi1,H1) and (pi2,H2)
there exists a one-to-one norm-preserving linear map U : H1 7→ H2 such
that Upi1(A)U
−1 = pi2(A) for all A ∈ A. Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics and
Go¨ttingen matrix mechanics can be seen as different Hilbert space represent-
ations of the same algebra of observables that is generated by the Heisenberg
commutation relations, and they are widely regarded as two formulations of
one and the same theory. The choice of representation is a matter of com-
putational convenience rather than physical significance in this case, but
outside the scope of ordinary QM, that is, in the realm of QM∞ where the
number of degrees of freedom is infinite and the algebra A admits unitarily
inequivalent Hilbert space representations, things are far less clear.
For the case of QM∞, Ruetsche considers two (later three) fundamentally
different approaches to the interpretation of the concepts just introduced.
The first of these, referred to by Ruetsche, following [Arageorgis 1995], as
Hilbert Space Conservatism, adamantly sticks to the conventional perspect-
ive of identifying the observables of a quantum theory with the self-adjoint
elements of a Hilbert space representation pi(A) (or, more precisely, with
the self-adjoint elements of pi(A)′′, the closure of pi(A) in the strong oper-
ator topology, see Fn. 3) and possible states ω of the system with density
operators ρ on a Hilbert space H such that ω(A) = Tr(ρA) for all A ∈ pi(A).
Doing so, the position makes use of the conceptually fundamental GNS rep-
resentation theorem (“GNS”, for Gel’fand, Naimark and Segal), according
to which any state ω on A defines a unique (up to unitary equivalence)
Hilbert space representation piω(A) such that for some (cyclic) vector |ξω〉
on the Hilbert space H of piω(A) all expectation values ω(A) can be written
as 〈ξω|piω(A)|ξω〉 for all A ∈ A. Unlike in ordinary QM, not all states ω on
A are in general expressible as density matrices on the Hilbert space of a
single state ω’s GNS representation. Those which can, for some ω, are said
to be in ω’s folium. States ω1, ω2 giving rise to unitarily inequivalent GNS
representations have different folia. If they are pure states, their folia are
disjoint, which means that no state expressible as a density matrix on the
Hilbert space H1 of the GNS representation of ω1 can be written as density
matrix on the Hilbert space H2 of the GNS representation of ω2, and vice
versa. The Hilbert Space Conservative regards as physically possible only
the states expressible as density matrices ρ in the strong closure of a single
state ω’s GNS representation piω(A), that is, only states in the folium of the
actual state of the system, whatever it is.
The Hilbert Space Conservative’s most important opponent, again in
the terminology introduced by [Arageorgis 1995], is the “Algebraic Imperi-
alist”. Algebraic Imperialism’s central claim is that the abstract C∗-algebra
A itself contains the full physical content of a quantum theory in the sense
elements of pi(A) itself, together with the limits of all sequences of pi(A) in this topology.
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that its self-adjoint elements correspond directly to the physical magnitudes
characterising the system and the states defined on A are identified with the
system’s possible states. For the Algebraic Imperialist, Hilbert space repres-
entations pi(A) of the algebra A are mere computational tools without any
independent physical significance. Algebraic Imperialism and Hilbert Space
Conservatism disagree on which states are physically possible—only those in
the folium of a particular state ω according to Hilbert Space Conservatism,
or all states defined on the algebra A according to Algebraic Imperialism.
Similarly, they disagree on what constitutes an observable—the self-adjoint
elements of some piω(A)′′ according to Hilbert Space Conservatism and the
self-adjoint elements of A itself according to Algebraic Imperialism. In ad-
dition to these two approaches, Ruetsche introduces a third which she calls
“Universalism”. Universalism construes the content of a quantum theory in
terms of a specific representation,namely, the direct sum of the GNS rep-
resentations of all states over A. As far as Ruetsche’s critique of the three
approaches is concerned, the problems and merits of Universalism do not
differ much from those of the two other approaches.
Rather than taking sides in the dispute between the three interpretive
strategies just outlined, Ruetsche criticises them all for not being able to
account for the full explanatory force which theories of QM∞ recognisably
have. The common feature of all three which she targets as the origin
of the difficulties they run into is that they specify the physical content
of a quantum theory prior to “the messy business of applying the theory
in question to individual problems.”4 By doing so, these interpretations
conform to what Ruetsche calls the “ideal of pristine interpretation”. As
she explains, this ideal is founded on the idea that the content of a theory
T be construed as “invariant under changes in T ’s applications, [so that] T
won’t admit different interpretations in different settings.”5 Ruetsche argues
at great length that the shortcoming of “pristine” interpretations to account
for the full explanatory force of theories of QM∞ is precisely due to the fact
that they follow the ideal of pristine interpretation. In contrast to this ideal,
she develops the conception of an “unpristine interpretation”, based on the
idea that the content of a physical theory T may depend on how T is actually
put to use. So, if T is interpreted in an “unpristine” way, this means that
what is regarded as physically possible according to T is dependent on what
precise applications of T one has in mind. In an unpristine interpretation of
a quantum theory the context of application is taken into account to decide
what mathematical objects correspond to (which) physical quantities and
which states are physically possible.
Ruetsche doesn’t mention a further important point of agreement among
the “pristine” interpretations she considers, which seems interesting to note:
4See p. 146.
5See p. 13.
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All of them conceive of quantum states as ontic states quantum systems are
in in that for each quantum system there is exactly one true quantum state
(the one it “is in”) which describes it correctly. While this (standard, or
“realist”) way of construing quantum states is admittedly very natural, it
has long been made responsible by interpreters for being the source of the no-
torious paradoxical aspects of quantum mechanics such as the measurement
problem and the apparent tension between quantum theory and relativity.6
Considering no collapse interpretations of quantum theory, Ruetsche
proposes that the “collapsed” state assigned to a quantum system after
measurement may be regarded as an “appropriate predictive instrument-
ality when considering [further] measurements.”7 According to this pro-
posal, quantum states that are assigned after measurement are not agent-
independent descriptions of objective properties of the systems they are
assigned to but mere instrumental devices to maximise predictive success.
Since post-measurement situations belong to the cases where we can reas-
onably hope to have the most complete knowledge and control of the situ-
ation at issue, there seems to be only a very small step from this idea to
a fully-fledged non-ontic view of quantum states that construes them as
non-descriptive in general. Furthermore, a non-ontic reading of quantum
states, which does not acknowledge any such thing as the quantum state a
quantum system is in, seems to go very well with the pragmatic spirit of the
“unpristine interpretations” Ruetsche favours.
Ruetsche’s main argument for unpristine interpretations, the “Coalesced
Structures Argument”, is centred on the claim that no pristine interpreta-
tion can account for what she calls “phase structure”—the coexistence of
macroscopically distinct equilibrium phases at certain values of paramet-
ers of a quantum theory such as coupling constants or temperature. The
most widely known examples of phase structure include the existence of
paramagnetic and ferromagnetic phases of iron at 1033 K and of liquid and
gaseous phases of water at 373 K. As Ruetsche explains in great detail,
the standard account of distinctions between different phases requires the
number of degrees of freedom of the system at issue to be infinite. For
the systems treated in quantum statistical mechanics, which Ruetsche con-
siders first, phase structure appears in the thermodynamic limit, where the
system size is taken to infinity while the ratio between particle number N
and volume V is kept constant. Distinctions between phases are defined by
6The most discussed alternative approaches to the ontic conception of quantum states
are epistemic accounts of quantum states, which interpret quantum states as in some
way reflecting the state assigning agents’ epistemic relations to the systems states are
assigned to rather than these systems’ objective properties. Quantum Bayesianism, as
developed by Fuchs, Caves and Schack, is perhaps the most-discussed such account, see
[Fuchs 2010] for a recent exposition. Richard Healey’s pragmatist approach to quantum
theory proposed in [Healey 2012] offers another non-ontic reading of quantum states that
avoids the notorious paradoxes along similar lines.
7See p. 171.
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discontinuities under variations of the parameters in the values of so-called
“macroobservables”. Macroobservables are characterised by the fact that
their value is constant over the whole system in a given phase. An example
of a discontinuity signalling a phase transition is the jump in the density of
water when turning from the liquid into the gaseous state or the jump in the
magnetic susceptibility of iron when turned from the paramagnetic into the
ferromagnetic phase. Troubles for Hilbert Space Conservatism start with the
observation, derived and discussed at length in the book, that states corres-
ponding to distinct (“pure”) phases have different folia, that is, that they
cannot be written as density matrices on a single Hilbert spaceH. Assuming
that different phases are physically possible for one and the same physical
system therefore means to regard more states as physically possible than
can be represented as density matrices on a common Hilbert space. This
implies that Hilbert Space Conservatism cannot account for phase structure
by not acknowledging enough states as physically possible.
Algebraic Imperialism faces a different challenge when attempting to
account for phase structure. While acknowledging all the necessary states
corresponding to distinct phases, the position does not interpret as observ-
ables the “macroobservables” in terms of which the phases are defined as
distinct in the first place. The reason for this is that the defining proper-
ties of macroobservables rule out that they be elements of the algebra A
(as explained in detail in the book), so that macroobservables simply are
not observables in the Algebraic Imperialist’s sense. Algebraic Imperialism
therefore lacks a criterion to distinguish, and to define in the first place, the
different phases the existence (and putative coexistence) of which is to be
explained. Universalism, as Ruetsche demonstrates, encounters very similar
problems. An additional difficulty that concerns both Algebraic Imperial-
ism and Universalism—the “W ∗ argument”, as Ruetsche calls it—is that
not all of the states which they acknowledge as physically possible have a
well-defined time-evolution on their GNS representation. Regarding states
admitting no time-evolution as physically possible seems inherently prob-
lematic.
An immediate objection to this line of thought is that real physical sys-
tems, to which the conceptual apparatus of quantum statistical mechanics
is applied in practice, are characterised only by a finite number of degrees of
freedom. To describe them in terms of infinitely many degrees of freedom,
it may be argued, means making an idealisation on which no substantive
interpretive claims should be based.8 Ruetsche herself tends towards the
alternative view that interpretations on the assumption of the thermody-
namic limit are legitimate in that taking this limit is vital to the explanat-
ory success of quantum statistical mechanics.9 She acknowledges, however,
8See, for instance, [Callender 2001] and Section 9 of [Earman 2004] for considerations
on which this objection might be based.
9Ruetsche defends this view by drawing attention to the success of renormalisation
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that this “idealization complaint”10 against her interpretive claims must be
taken seriously. To support the Coalesced Structures Argument against it,
she turns to conventional (“Lagrangean”) quantum field theory (QFT), as
used with great success, for instance, in contemporary high energy physics
to predict and explain the results of accelerator experiments. Since theories
of conventional QFT are formulated in terms of a space-time continuum,
challenging the assumption that the number of degrees of freedom is infinite
seems more difficult in this context.11
A large part of Ruetsche’s discussion of the Coalesced Structures Ar-
gument in conventional QFT is centred around the notion of spontaneous
symmetry breaking (SSB), to which, again, she provides an extremely useful
introduction. Intuitively, a state exhibits SSB just in case the symmetries of
the underlying laws of motion are radically absent from it (see Chapter 13
for a rigorous criterion of SSB). SSB is closely related to phase structure in
that the distinction between states of broken and unbroken symmetry com-
monly lines up with a distinction between different phases. In conventional
QFT, SSB is widely believed to play a fundamental role in the generation of
particle masses in form of the “Higgs mechanism”, which is often associated
with the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry.12
As Ruetsche sees it, her strategy to defend the Coalesced Structures
Argument by appeal to physicists’ QFT faces two major obstacles. The
first is that, at least at present, we do not have any rigorous formulation of
the most successful theories of conventional QFT in the algebraic framework.
Therefore, the question of whether physicists’ QFT supports her case against
pristine interpretations is at least in part a matter of speculation about
future physics.
The second obstacle which she recognises is that the alleged explanatory
role of SSB, and hence the status of phase structure in conventional QFT,
remain unclear inasmuch the status of SSB in the generation of particle
group theory in accounting for universality and critical phenomena, which success, as she
argues, is crucially based on the idealisations of the thermodynamic limit (see p. 339). This
claim can be questioned, however, for instance by pointing to the fact that analyses that
employ renormalisation group techniques may still have to take into account the finiteness
of real systems to have maximum explanatory success. See [Butterfield and Bouatta 2011]
for a study of reduction and emergence in phase transitions that emphasises this point.
10See p. 330.
11It might be challenged, however, arguing from the fact that the QFTs of the standard
model of elementary particle physics are nowadays widely regarded as effective field the-
ories, whose range of validity does not extend to arbitrarily high energies and arbitrarily
small distances.
12See, for instance, Chapter 14 of [Halzen and Martin 1984] for a standard account of
the Higgs mechanism in terms of this notion. A gauge symmetry is a symmetry where
different variable configurations related by symmetry transformations correspond to the
same physical situation. See [Earman 2004], Section 6, for an introduction to gauge sym-
metries aimed at philosophers.
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masses through the Higgs mechanism continues to be a matter of debate.13
Unfortunately, however, Ruetsche’s discussion of gauge symmetry breaking
and the Higgs mechanism is misleading in several respects. Its most blatant
shortcoming is that it identifies a specific choice of gauge (comparable in
its significance to the choice of a coordinate system), namely, the unitary
gauge, with “the state of broken symmetry suiting the Higgs mechanism.”14
This is misleading, first, in that a gauge is not a “state” at all, in partic-
ular not one exhibiting broken symmetry, and, second, in that making the
specific choice of the unitary gauge specifically means eliminating the gauge
symmetry completely at an “explicit” level, so that SSB cannot occur at
all.15 Other choices of gauge fixing do not eliminate the gauge symmetry
completely and allow that a remnant global subsymmetry of the local gauge
symmetry can still be spontaneously broken. However, the relation between
these instances of SSB and phase structure is very complicated in that the
distinction between broken and unbroken remnant global gauge symmetry
is not in general associated with a distinction between different phases.16
As far as local gauge symmetries themselves are concerned, it has to
be noted that our current frameworks of quantising gauge theories do not
support the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry at all.
This statement can be made rigorous in the context of lattice gauge theory,
where it is known as “Elitzur’s theorem”.17 However, regardless of what one
actually sees as the role of SSB in the Higgs mechanism or in particle physics
more generally, it is uncontroversial that our most successful theories of
conventional QFT exhibit a very rich phase structure.18 This may be taken
to ground some optimism for Ruetsche’s hope that these theories, once cast
in a rigorous formulation using the algebraic framework, might exhibit “a
structure sustaining the Coalesced Structures Argument.”19
As Ruetsche argues in the final chapter of the book, the conclusion that
in order to account for the full explanatory force of theories of QM∞ one
has to give an unpristine interpretation of them has important ramifications
for more general issues in the philosophy of science. Most importantly, she
regards it as indicating a problem for the various brands of scientific real-
ism, which all try to account for the empirical success of our best scientific
theories by assuming that they are true, which, as she argues, must be con-
13For a challenge to the conventional perspective on SSB in the Higgs mechanism see,
for instance, [Earman 2004], Section 9.
14See p. 331.
15The main advantage of the unitary gauge is that it is useful in a classical argument
giving an idea as to which degrees of freedom are physical and which can be “gauged
away”.
16See [Caudy and Greensite 2008] for a state-of-the-art computational study of this issue
and [Friederich 2012] for an interpretive discussion aimed at philosophers.
17See [Elitzur(1975)].
18See, for instance, [Linde 1979] for a classic reference.
19See p. 335.
8
strued as true under a single interpretation. Contrary to this doctrine, the
Coalesced Structures Argument suggests that the empirical success of the-
ories of QM∞ can be accounted for only if different interpretations are given
for different contexts of application. As Ruetsche sees it, even sophisticated
versions of scientific realism, for instance the position defended by Richard
Boyd or the nowadays much discussed Structural Realism in both its “epi-
stemic” and “ontic” varieties, are all incompatible with this idea. Given
the importance and tremendous success of quantum theories, this challenge
to scientific realism deserves serious consideration. Due to the clarity of
Ruetsche’s formulation of it the stage is well set for the realists to come up
with their rejoinders.
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